Christianity & Liberalism – J. Gresham Machen: Introduction

Christianity and Liberalism
By J. Gresham Machen
Introduction

The purpose of this book is not to decide the religious issue of the present day, but merely to present the issue as sharply and clearly as possible, in order that the reader may be aided in deciding it for himself. Presenting an issue sharply is indeed by no means a popular business at the present time; there are many who prefer to fight their intellectual battles in what Dr. Francis L. Patton has aptly called a "condition of low visibility."[1] Clear-cut definition of terms in religious matters, bold facing of the logical implications of religious views, is by many persons regarded as an impious proceeding. May it not discourage contribution to mission boards? May it not hinder the progress of consolidation, and produce a poor showing in columns of Church statistics? But with such persons we cannot possibly bring ourselves to agree. Light may seem at times to be an impertinent intruder, but it is always beneficial in the end. The type of religion which rejoices in the pious sound of traditional phrases, regardless of their meanings, or shrinks from "controversial" matters, will never stand amid the shocks of life. In the sphere of religion, as in other spheres, the things about which men are agreed are apt to be the things that are least worth holding; the really important things are the things about which men will fight.

In the sphere of religion, in particular, the present time is a time of conflict; the great redemptive religion which has always been known as Christianity is battling against a totally diverse type of religious belief, which is only the more destructive of the Christian faith because it makes use of traditional Christian terminology. This modern non-redemptive religion is called "modernism" or "liberalism." Both names are unsatisfactory; the latter, in particular, is question-begging. The movement designated as "liberalism" is regarded as "liberal" only by its friends; to its opponents it seems to involve a narrow ignoring of many relevant facts. And indeed the movement is so various in its manifestations that one may almost despair of finding any common name which will apply to all its forms. But manifold as are the forms in which the movement appears, the root of the movement is one; the many varieties of modern liberal religion are rooted innaturalism--that is, in the denial of any entrance of the creative power of God (as distinguished from the ordinary course of nature) in connection with the origin of Christianity. The word "naturalism" is here used in a sense somewhat different from its philosophical meaning. In this non-philosophical sense it describes with fair accuracy the real root of what is called, by what may turn out to be a degradation of an originally noble word, "liberal" religion.

The rise of this modern naturalistic liberalism has not come by chance, but has been occasioned by important changes which have recently taken place in the conditions of life. The past one hundred years have witnessed the beginning of a new era in human history, which may conceivably be regretted, but certainly cannot be ignored, by the most obstinate conservatism. The change is not something that lies beneath the surface and might be visible only to the discerning eye; on the contrary it forces itself upon the attention of the plain man at a hundred points. Modern inventions and the industrialism that has been built upon them have given us in many respects a new world to live in; we can no more remove ourselves from that world than we can escape from the atmosphere that we breathe.

But such changes in the material conditions of life do not stand alone; they have been produced by mighty changes in the human mind, as in their turn they themselves give rise to further spiritual changes. The industrial world of today has been produced not by blind forces of nature but by the conscious activity of the human spirit; it has been produced by the achievements of science. The outstanding feature of recent history is an enormous widening of human knowledge, which has gone hand in hand with such perfecting of the instrument of investigation that scarcely any limits can be assigned to future progress in the material realm.

The application of modern scientific methods is almost as broad as the universe in which we live. Though the most palpable achievements are in the sphere of physics and chemistry, the sphere of human life cannot be isolated from the rest, and with the other sciences there has appeared, for example, a modern science of history, which, with psychology and sociology and the like, claims, even if it does not deserve, full equality with its sister sciences. No department of knowledge can maintain its isolation from the modern lust of scientific conquest; treaties of inviolability, though hallowed by all the sanctions of age-long tradition, are being flung ruthlessly to the winds.

In such an age, it is obvious that every inheritance from the past must be subject to searching criticism; and as a matter of fact some convictions of the human race have crumbled to pieces in the test. Indeed, dependence of any institution upon the past is now sometimes even regarded as furnishing a presumption, not in favor of it, but against it. So many convictions have had to be abandoned that men have sometimes come to believe that all convictions must go.

If such an attitude be justifiable, then no institution is faced by a stronger hostile presumption than the institution of the Christian religion, for no institution has based itself more squarely upon the authority of a bygone age. We are not now inquiring whether such policy is wise or historically justifiable; in any case the fact itself is plain, that Christianity during many centuries has consistently appealed for the truth of its claims, not merely and not even primarily to current experience, but to certain ancient books the most recent of which was written some nineteen hundred years ago. It is no wonder that that appeal is being criticized today; for the writers of the books in question were no doubt men of their own age, whose outlook upon the material world, judged by modern standards, must have been of the crudest and most elementary kind. Inevitably the question arises whether the opinions of such men can ever be normative for men of the present day; in other words, whether first-century religion can ever stand in company with twentieth-century science.

However the question may be answered, it presents a serious problem to the modern Church. Attempts are indeed sometimes made to make the answer easier than at first sight it appears to be. Religion, it is said, is so entirely separate from science, that the two, rightly defined, cannot possibly come into conflict. This attempt at separation, as it is hoped the following pages may show, is open to objections of the most serious kind. But what must now be observed is that even if the separation is justifiable it cannot be effected without effort; the removal of the problem of religion and science itself constitutes a problem. For, rightly or wrongly, religion during the centuries has as a matter of fact connected itself with a host of convictions, especially in the sphere of history, which may form the subject of scientific investigation; just as scientific investigators, on the other hand, have sometimes attached themselves, again rightly or wrongly, to conclusions which impinge upon the innermost domain of philosophy and of religion. For example, if any simple Christian of one hundred years ago, or even of today, were asked what would become of his religion if history should prove indubitably that no man called Jesus ever lived and died in the first century of our era, he would undoubtedly answer that his religion would fall away. Yet the investigation of events in the first century in Judea, just as much as in Italy or in Greece, belongs to the sphere of scientific history. In other words, our simple Christian, whether rightly or wrongly, whether wisely or unwisely, has as a matter of fact connected his religion, in a way that to him seems indissoluble, with convictions about which science also has a right to speak. If, then, those convictions, ostensibly religious, which belong to the sphere of science, are not really religious at all, the demonstration of that fact is itself no trifling task. Even if the problem of science and religion reduces itself to the problem of disentangling religion from pseudoscientific accretions, the seriousness of the problem is not thereby diminished. From every point of view, therefore, the problem in question is the most serious concern of the Church. What is the relation between Christianity and modern culture; may Christianity be maintained in a scientific age?

It is this problem which modern liberalism attempts to solve. Admitting that scientific objections may arise against the particularities of the Christian religion-- against the Christian doctrines of the person of Christ, and of redemption through His death and resurrection--the liberal theologian seeks to rescue certain of the general principles of religion, of which these particularities are thought to be mere temporary symbols, and these general principles he regards as constituting "the essence of Christianity."

It may well be questioned, however, whether this method of defense will really prove to be efficacious; for after the apologist has abandoned his outer defenses to the enemy and withdrawn into some inner citadel, he will probably discover that the enemy pursues him even there. Modern materialism, especially in the realm of psychology, is not content with occupying the lower quarters of the Christian city, but pushes its way into all the higher reaches of life; it is just as much opposed to the philosophical idealism of the liberal preacher as to the Biblical doctrines that the liberal preacher has abandoned in the interests of peace. Mere concessiveness, therefore, will never succeed in avoiding the intellectual conflict. In the intellectual battle of the present day there can be no "peace without victory"; one side or the other must win.

As a matter of fact, however, it may appear that the figure which has just been used is altogether misleading; it may appear that what the liberal theologian has retained after abandoning to the enemy one Christian doctrine after another is not Christianity at all, but a religion which is so entirely different from Christianity as to be long in a distinct category. It may appear further that the fears of the modern man as to Christianity were entirely ungrounded, and that in abandoning the embattled walls of the city of God he has fled in needless panic into the open plains of a vague natural religion only to fall an easy victim to the enemy who ever lies in ambush there.

Two lines of criticism, then, are possible with respect to the liberal attempt at reconciling science and Christianity. Modern liberalism may be criticized (1) on the ground that it is unchristian and (2) on the ground that it is unscientific. We shall concern ourselves here chiefly with the former line of criticism; we shall be interested in showing that despite the liberal use of traditional phraseology modern liberalism not only is a different religion from Christianity but belongs in a totally different class of religions. But in showing that the liberal attempt at rescuing Christianity is false we are not showing that there is no way of rescuing Christianity at all; on the contrary, it may appear incidentally, even in the present little book, that it is not the Christianity of the New Testament which is in conflict with science, but the supposed Christianity of the modern liberal Church, and that the real city of God, and that city alone, has defenses which are capable of warding of the assaults of modern unbelief. However, our immediate concern is with the other side of the problem; our principal concern just now is to show that the liberal attempt at reconciling Christianity with modern science has really relinquished everything distinctive of Christianity, so that what remains is in essentials only that same indefinite type of religious aspiration which was in the world before Christianity came upon the scene. In trying to remove from Christianity everything that could possibly be objected to in the name of science, in trying to bribe off the enemy by those concessions which the enemy most desires, the apologist has really abandoned what he started out to defend. Here as in many other departments of life it appears that the things that are sometimes thought to be hardest to defend are also the things that are most worth defending. In maintaining that liberalism in the modern Church represents a return to an unchristian and sub-Christian form of the religious life, we are particularly anxious not to be misunderstood. "Unchristian" in such a connection is sometimes taken as a term of opprobrium. We do not mean it at all as such. Socrates was not a Christian, neither was Goethe; yet we share to the full the respect with which their names are regarded. They tower immeasurably above the common run of men; if he that is least in the Kingdom of Heaven is greater than they, he is certainly greater not by any inherent superiority, but by virtue of an undeserved privilege which ought to make him humble rather than contemptuous. Such considerations, however, should not be allowed to obscure the vital importance of the question at issue. If a condition could be conceived in which all the preaching of the Church should be controlled by the liberalism which in many quarters has already become preponderant, then, we believe, Christianity would at last have perished from the earth and the gospel would have sounded forth for the last time. If so, it follows that the inquiry with which we are now concerned is immeasurably the most important of all those with which the Church has to deal. Vastly more important than all questions with regard to methods of preaching is the root question as to what it is that shall be preached. Many, no doubt, will turn in impatience from the inquiry--all those, namely, who have settled the question in, such a way that they cannot even conceive of its being reopened. Such, for example, are the pietists, of whom there are still many. "What," they say, "is the need of argument in defense of the Bible? Is it not the Word of God, and does it not carry with it an immediate certitude of its truth which could only be obscured by defense? If science comes into contradiction with the Bible so much the worse for science!" For these persons we have the highest respect, for we believe that they are right in the main point; they have arrived by a direct and easy road at a conviction which for other men is attained only through intellectual struggle. But we cannot reasonably expect them to be interested in what we have to say. Another class of uninterested persons is much more numerous. It consists of those who have definitely settled the question in the opposite way. By them this little book, if it ever comes into their hands, will soon be flung aside as only another attempt at defense of a position already hopelessly lost. There are still individuals, they will say, who believe that the earth is flat; there are also individuals who defend the Christianity of the Church, miracles and atonement and all. In either case, it will be said, the phenomenon is interesting as a curious example of arrested development, but it is nothing more.

Such a closing of the question, however, whether it approve itself finally or no, is in its present form based upon a very imperfect view of the situation; it is based upon a grossly exaggerated estimate of the achievements of modern science. Scientific investigation, as has already been observed, has certainly accomplished much; it has in many respects produced a new world. But there is another aspect of the picture which should not be ignored. The modern world represents in some respects an enormous improvement over the world in which our ancestors lived; but in other respects it exhibits a lamentable decline. The improvement appears in the physical conditions of life, but in the spiritual realm there is a corresponding loss. The loss is clearest, perhaps, in the realm of art. Despite the mighty revolution which has been produced in the external conditions of life, no great poet is now living to celebrate the change; humanity has suddenly become dumb. Gone, too, are the great painters and the great musicians and the great sculptors. The art that still subsists is largely imitative, and where it is not imitative it is usually bizarre. Even the appreciation of the glories of the past is gradually being lost, under the influence of a utilitarian education that concerns itself only with the production of physical well-being. The "Outline of History" of Mr. H. G. Wells, with its contemptuous neglect of all the higher ranges of human life, is a thoroughly modern book.

This unprecedented decline in literature and art is only one manifestation of a more far-reaching phenomenon; it is only one instance of that narrowing of the range of personality which has been going on in the modern world. The whole development of modern society has tended mightily toward the limitation of the realm of freedom for the individual man. The tendency is most clearly seen in socialism; a socialistic state would mean the reduction to a minimum of the sphere of individual choice. Labor and recreation, under a socialistic government, would both be prescribed, and individual liberty would be gone. But the same tendency exhibits itself today even in those communities where the name of socialism is most abhorred. When once the majority has determined that a certain regime is beneficial, that regime without further hesitation is forced ruthlessly upon the individual man. It never seems to occur to modern legislatures that although "welfare" is good, forced welfare may be bad. In other words, utilitarianism is being carried out to its logical conclusions; in the interests of physical well-being the great principles of liberty are being thrown ruthlessly to the winds.

The result is an unparalleled impoverishment of human life. Personality can only be developed in the realm of individual choice. And that realm, in the modern state, is being slowly but steadily contracted. The tendency is making itself felt especially in the sphere of education. The object of education, it is now assumed, is the production of the greatest happiness for the greatest number. But the greatest happiness for the greatest number, it is assumed further, can be defined only by the will of the majority. Idiosyncrasies in education, therefore, it is said, must be avoided, and the choice of schools must be taken away from the individual parent and placed in the hands of the state. The state then exercises its authority through the instruments that are ready to hand, and at once, therefore, the child is placed under the control of psychological experts, themselves without the slightest acquaintance with the higher realms of human life, who proceed to prevent any such acquaintance being gained by those who come under their care. Such a result is being slightly delayed in America by the remnants of Anglo-Saxon individualism, but the signs of the times are all contrary to the maintenance of this halfway position; liberty is certainly held by but a precarious tenure when once its underlying principles have been lost. For a time it looked as though the utilitarianism which came into vogue in the middle of the nineteenth century would be a purely academic matter, without influence upon daily life. But such appearances have proved to be deceptive. The dominant tendency, even in a country like America, which formerly prided itself on its freedom from bureaucratic regulation of the details of life, is toward a drab utilitarianism in which all higher aspirations are to be lost.

Manifestations of such a tendency can easily be seen. In the state of Nebraska, for example, a law is now in force according to which no instruction in any school in the state, public or private, is to be given through the medium of a language other than English, and no language other than English is to be studied even as a language until the child has passed an examination before the county superintendent of education showing that the eighth grade has been passed.[2] In other words, no foreign language, apparently not even Latin or Greek, is to be studied until the child is too old to learn it well. It is in this way that modern collectivism deals with a kind of study which is absolutely essential to all genuine mental advance. The minds of the people of Nebraska, and of any other states where similar laws prevail,[3] are to be kept by the power of the state in a permanent condition of arrested development.

It might seem as though with such laws obscurantism had reached its lowest possible depths. But there are depths lower still. In the state of Oregon, on Election Day, 1922, a law was passed by a referendum vote in accordance with which all children in the state are required to attend the public schools. Christian schools and private schools, at least in the all-important lower grades, are thus wiped out of existence. Such laws, which if the present temper of the people prevails will probably soon be extended far beyond the bounds of one state,[4] [which will] mean of course the ultimate destruction of all real education. When one considers what the public schools of America in many places already are--their materialism, their discouragement of any sustained intellectual effort, their encouragement of the dangerous pseudoscientific fads of experimental psychology--one can only be appalled by the thought of a commonwealth in which there is no escape from such a soul-killing system. But the principle of such laws and their ultimate tendency are far worse than the immediate results.[5] A public school system, in itself, is indeed of enormous benefit to the race. But it is of benefit only if it is kept healthy at every moment by the absolutely free possibility of the competition of private schools. A public school system, if it means the providing of free education for those who desire it, is a noteworthy and beneficent achievement of modern times; but when once it becomes monopolistic it is the most perfect instrument of tyranny which has yet been devised. Freedom of thought in the middle ages was combated by the Inquisition, but the modern method is far more effective. Place the lives of children in their formative years, despite the convictions of their parents, under the intimate control of experts appointed by the state, force them then to attend schools where the higher aspirations of humanity are crushed out, and where the mind is filled with the materialism of the day, and it is difficult to see how even the remnants of liberty can subsist. Such a tyranny, supported as it is by a perverse technique used as the instrument in destroying human souls, is certainly far more dangerous than the crude tyrannies of the past, which despite their weapons of fire and sword permitted thought at least to be free.

The truth is that the materialistic paternalism of the present day, if allowed to go on unchecked, will rapidly make of America one huge "Main Street," where spiritual adventure will be discouraged and democracy will be regarded as consisting in the reduction of all mankind to the proportions of the narrowest and least gifted of the citizens. God grant that there may come a reaction, and that the great principles of Anglo-Saxon liberty may be rediscovered before it is too late! But whatever solution be found for the educational and social problems of our own country, a lamentable condition must be detected in the world at large. It cannot be denied that great men are few or nonexistent, and that there has been a general contracting of the area of personal life. Material betterment has gone hand in hand with spiritual decline.

Such a condition of the world ought to cause the choice between modernism and traditionalism, liberalism and conservatism, to be approached without any of the prejudice which is too often displayed. In view of the lamentable defects of modern life, a type of religion certainly should not be commended simply because it is modern or condemned simply because it is old. On the contrary, the condition of mankind is such that one may well ask what it is that made the men of past generations so great and the men of the present generation so small. In the midst of all the material achievements of modern life, one may well ask the question whether in gaining the whole world we have not lost our own soul. Are we forever condemned to live the sordid life of utilitarianism? Or is there some lost secret which if rediscovered will restore to mankind something of the glories of the past?

Such a secret the writer of this little book would discover in the Christian religion. But the Christian religion which is meant is certainly not the religion of the modern liberal Church, but a message of divine grace, almost forgotten now, as it was in the middle ages, but destined to burst forth once more in God's good time, in a new Reformation, and bring light and freedom to mankind. What that message is can be made clear, as is the case with all definition, only by way of exclusion, by way of contrast. In setting forth the current liberalism, now almost dominant in the Church, over against Christianity, we are animated, therefore, by no merely negative or polemic purpose; on the contrary, by showing what Christianity is not we hope to be able to show what Christianity is, in order that men may be led to turn from the weak and beggarly elements and have recourse again to the grace of God.

1. Francis L. Patton, in the introduction to William Hallock Johnson The Christian Faith Under Modern Searchlight, [1916], p. 7.

2. See Laws, Resolutions and Memorials passed by the Legislature of the State of Nebraska at the Thirty-Seventh Session, 1919, Chapter 249, p. 1019.

3. Compare, for example, Legislative Acts of the General Assembly of Ohio, Vol. cviii, 1919, pp. 614f.; and Act, and Joint Resolutions of the General Assembly of Iowa, 1919, Chapter 198, p. 219.

4. In Michigan, a bill similar to the one now passed in Oregon recently received an enormous vote at a referendum, and an agitation looking at least in the same general direction is said to be continuing.

5. The evil principle is seen with special clearness in the so-called "Lusk Laws" in the state of New York. One of these refers to teachers in the public schools. The other provides that "No person, firm, corporation or society shall conduct, maintain or operate any school, institute, class or course of instruction in any subjects whatever without making application for and being granted a license from the university of the state of New York to so conduct, maintain or operate such institute, school, class or course." It is further provided that "A school, institute, class or course licensed as provided In this section shall be subject to visitation by officers and employees of the university of the state of New York." See Laws of the State of New York, 1921, Vol. III, Chapter 667, pp. 2049-2051. This law is so broadly worded that it could not possibly be enforced, even by the whole German army in its pre-war efficiency or by all the espionage system of the Czar. The exact measure of enforcement is left to the discretion of officials, and the citizens are placed in constant danger of that intolerable interference with private life which real enforcement of the provision about "courses of instruction in any subjects whatever" would mean. One of the exemptions is in principle particularly bad. "Nor shall such license he required:' the law provides. "By schools now or hereafter established and maintained by a religious denomination or sect well recognized as such at the time this section takes effect." One can certainly rejoice that the existing churches are freed, for the time being, from the menace involved in the law. But in principle the limitation of the exemption to the existing churches really runs counter to the fundamental idea Of religious liberty; for it sets up a distinction between established religions and those that are not established. There was always tolerance for established religious bodies, even in the Roman Empire; but religious liberty consists in equal rights for religious bodies that are new. The other exemptions do not remove in the slightest the oppressive character of the law. Bad as the law must be in its Immediate effects, it is far more alarming in what it reveals about the temper of the people. A people which tolerates such preposterous legislation upon the statute books is a people that has wandered far away from the principles of American liberty. True patriotism will not conceal the menace, but will rather seek to recall the citizens to those great principles for which our fathers, in America and In England, were willing to bleed and die. There are some encouraging indications that the Lusk Laws may soon be repealed. If they are repealed, they will still serve as A warning that only by constant watchfulness can liberty be preserved.

1 John 2:2 – Gary Long on propitiation

From the book, “Definite Atonement,” available at Backus Books.

PROPITIATION IN I JOHN 2:2
(A Doctrinal Study on the Extent of the Atonement)
Dr. Gary D. Long

_____________________

Introduction

In discussing the design or extent of the atonement, there are three key doctrinal terms which are related to the priestly sacrifice of Christ on earth, that is, to the finished work of Christ. These terms are redemption, propitiation and reconciliation. Evangelical Arminians and Calvinistic "four point" universalists or modified Calvinists1 hold that there is a universal design of the atonement which provides salvation for all mankind without exception or which places all of Adam's posterity in a savable state. They contend that there is a twofold application of these three doctrinal terms — an actual application for those who believe, a provisional application for those who die in unbelief. The historic "five point" or consistent Calvinist2 asserts that these terms have no substitutionary reference with respect to the non-elect. In contrast to the former who hold to an indefinite atonement, the consistent Calvinist, who holds to a definite atonement, sees no purpose, benefit or comfort in a redemption that does not redeem, a propitiation that does not propitiate or a reconciliation that does not reconcile, which would be the case if these terms were applicable to the non-elect.
For those who have wrestled with the extent of the atonement, they are acutely aware that there are three problem verses3 which the five point Calvinist must scripturally answer if he is to consistently sustain a biblical position before the modified Calvinist that the saving design of the atonement is intended by the triune God only for the elect. These verses are II Peter 2:1, which pertains to redemption; I John 2:2, which pertains to propitiation; and II Corinthians 5:19, which pertains to reconciliation. If the particular redemptionist can scripturally establish in any of these verses that God's design of the atonement does not extend to the non-elect, then the theological case for the unlimited redemptionist crumples. In summary, if universal propitiation in I John 2:2 cannot be biblically established, then what purpose does a universal redemption in II Peter 2:1 or a universal reconciliation in II Corinthians 5:19 serve? Can it be true that God the Son redeemed the non-elect for whom God the Father's wrath will never be propitiated (satisfied or appeased) by virtue of Christ's death or that God the Father has been reconciled by virtue of Christ's death to the non-elect upon whom His condemning wrath eternally abides (John 3:36)?
The purpose of this doctrinal appendix (the second in a series by the author on problem verses relating to the extent of the atonement) is to theologically approach I John 2:2, which relates to propitiation — the second of the three major doctrinal terms. May those who have believed through grace find this appendix of much help in their doctrinal study of the Word of God.

Propitiation in the New Testament

The term "propitiation" (hilasmos) means "satisfaction," "appeasement." Theologically, propitiation means that God's wrath against sin, demanded by His justice, is appeased on account of the death of Christ for sinners. There are four primary references in the New Testament where the word "propitiation" is used (cf. Rom. 3:25; Heb. 2:17; 1 John 2:2;4: 10). Three of the four references clearly teach that propitiation is strictly limited to a definite people, namely, the elect of God. Romans 3:25 states that God set forth Christ "a propitiation through faith in his blood." From this reference it may be observed that, if Christ is a propitiation "through faith,"4 He cannot be a propitiation to those who never have faith, and "all men have not faith" (II Thess. 3:2). Hebrews 2:17 states that Christ was made a "merciful and faithful high priest in things pertaining to God, to make reconciliation (should be translated propitiation) for the sins of the people." In context, "the people," are identified as the "children which God hath given" Christ, (v. 13), "the seed of Abraham" (v. 16). Are not "the people" of verse 17 also to be identified with the "many sons" in verse 10 and the "every man" in verse 9 for whom "by the grace of God he should taste death"? I John 4:10 reveals the motivating cause of propitiation. "Herein is love, not that we loved God, but that he loved us, and sent his Son to be the propitiation for our sins."5 The propitiation is restricted here to the definite pronouns, "we," "us," and "our"; that is, to believers, God's elect. Therefore, it is concluded that at least three of the four major passages on propitiation are restricted in design to God's elect.

I John 2:2

Concerning I John 2:2, Calvinistic universalists say it teaches two aspects of propitiation. One writes:

There is a propitiation which affects God in His relation to the kosmos — with no reference to the elect — and one which affects His relation to the elect. This twofold propitiation is set forth in I John 2:2.6

The sum of the four point Calvinist position is that Christ is said, in some sense, to be the propitiation for the sins of the whole world, meaning all mankind without exception. This, according to another Calvinistic universalist, is "the normal unbiased approach to this text."7
The meaning and nature of propitiation is not a matter of disagreement between four and five point Calvinists. The issue lies in the extent of propitiation as taught in I John 2:2. Much has been written concerning both sides of the issue. An examination of these writings reveals that the crux of the difference hinges upon the term "whole world." The four point Calvinists say the meaning is obvious. The words themselves, they say, without any wresting, signify all men in the world, that is, world means world. John Owen, the Puritan, writes, concerning the dogmatism with which the modified Calvinists assert their "darling"8 proof for unlimited atonement, by saying:

The world, the whole world, all, all men! — who can oppose it? Call them [the modified Calvinists] to the context in the several places where the words are; appeal to rules of interpretation; mind them of the circumstances and scope of the place, the sense of the same words in other places; . . . [and] they. . . cry out, the bare word, the letter is theirs: "Away with the gloss and interpretation; give us [the modified Calvinists] leave to believe what the word expressly saith."9

Biblical Universal Terminology

That I John 2:2 contains universal language is evident from the term "whole world." John 3:16 also uses the universal term "world" in the same manner. It is clear, therefore, that there is a biblical or divine universalism taught in Scripture. However, the issue does not center on the fact that universal terminology is used. It centers on the meaning or interpretation of that terminology.

Four Interpretations of the Term "Whole World"

The major views which are universalistic in their interpretation of "whole world" in I John 2:2 will be discussed under the following four systematic headings: "generical," "geographical," "eschatological," and "ethnological."

The Generical Interpretation

The generical interpretation of I John 2:2 is held by those who believe that Christ's atonement was unlimited in design for the whole human race. Their usual interpretation of the text is that Christ "is the propitiation for our sins (meaning believers), and not for ours only, but also for the sins of the whole world (including the non-elect)." This view interprets "whole world" to mean all men generically or universally, that is, each and every member of Adam's race. Therefore, propitiation for the sins of the world does not save the world; rather it only "secures the possibility of salvation."10 Furthermore, this view distinguishes between the advocacy and propitiatory work of Christ in I John 2:1,2 and associates actual salvation only with Christ's advocacy. This means that Christ's propitiation on earth was and is universal for all men — both the elect and non-elect alike. His advocacy in heaven, however, is restricted for those only who believe in Him. The contingency of one's salvation, therefore, rests upon man and the so-called "condition of faith."11 In other words, what now brings unbelievers into condemnation is not their sins — God has been satisfied for them by the blood of Christ — but the sin of rejecting Christ as the divinely appointed mediator of salvation. But Warfield rightly objects to this by saying:

Is not the rejection of Jesus as our propitiation a sin? And if it is a sin, is it not like other sins, covered by the death of Christ? If this great sin is excepted from the expiatory [effectual covering] of Christ's blood, why did not John tell us so, instead of declaring without qualification that Jesus Christ is the propitiation for our sins, and not for ours only but for the whole world? And surely it would be very odd if the sin of rejection of the Redeemer were the only condemning sin, in a world the vast majority of the dwellers in which have never heard of this Redeemer, and nevertheless perish. On what ground do they perish, all their sins having been expiated?12

There are a number of observations that can be made in objection to the generical or universal interpretation of I John 2:2. Some of the more significant ones immediately follow, others will be mentioned in the discussion under the geographical, eschatological and ethnological subheadings.

Terminological objection. — The first observation made in objection to the generical view concerns the use of the term "world" (kosmos) in the New Testament. That kosmos can and does have more than the meaning of all mankind generically cannot be denied (cf. John 1:10,11; 3:17; 12:31; 17:6,9,1 l,18,21,23,24).13 In fact kosmos, as effectually demonstrated in Owen's work,14 has many uses and meanings — the usual meaning being "many of mankind." According to the New Testament Greek text, kosmos occurs about 185 times. It is used some 105 times by the apostle John, 47 times by Paul and 33 times by other writers. With the use of a concordance, it is readily observed that kosmos is never used by Paul or the other writers to mean all mankind generically in a salvation context unless John's usage is the exception. It is used of all mankind universally in a context of sin and judgment (Rom. 3:6, 19; 5:12), but never in a salvation context. In John's writings, kosmos is used a total of 78 times in his gospel, 23 times in I John and 4 times in II John and Revelation. A check of each of these references, in context, reveals that there are perhaps, at the most, eleven occurrences in ten verses which could possibly, even according to Arminianism, mean all mankind generically in a salvation context. These occurrences are found in John 1:29; 3:16; two times in 3:17; once each in John 4:42; 6:33, 51; 12:47; 16:8 and once each in I John 2:2 and 4:14. Concerning the possible usage of kosmos to mean all mankind without exception in the redemptive context of I John 2:2, let the reader observe that kosmos is used differently at least 21 out of 23 times elsewhere in the epistle. As a matter of fact, the identical term "whole world" is used in I John 5:19 where it cannot possibly mean all mankind absolutely. John writes: "we know that we are of God, and the whole world lieth in wickedness (in the wicked one)." Can this be true of the believer who is in Christ? Let the reader judge. If the term "whole world" in I John 2:2 means all mankind generically, it is an exceptional usage in the epistle (objectively, only in I John 2:2 and 4:14 could it possibly refer to all mankind without exception — two times out of 23 occurrences). Therefore, it is the writer's contention that the burden of proof rests upon those who interpret "whole world" generically to establish that the term means all mankind in any redemptive context, let alone I John 2:2. In the writer's research he has not found any writer who holds to an indefinite atonement attempting to do this; rather the term is always said to mean, in a "normal and unbiased approach," the whole world, meaning all mankind,15 both the elect and the non-elect.

Logical objection. — The second observation made in objection to the generical view is logical. It is based upon the principle of the analogy of faith and relates to the design of propitiation from the standpoint of the special and distinguishing love of God. The fact that Christ's blood was an appeasement of God's wrath, in order that the chief purpose of God's love might be manifested, demands Christ's death. But if God's giving His Son is a manifesting of His special distinguishing love (and it is), and if "He spared not his own Son, but delivered him up for us all, how shall he not with him also freely give us all things" (Rom. 8:32)? The answer to this question should be obvious. The term "whole world" cannot refer to all mankind generically in a salvation context, for the non-elect do not receive all or any of the gifts of saving grace which (according to Rom. 8:32) is assured to them if, in reality, Christ actually died for them. Do all men have faith (II Thess. 3:2)?16

Contextual objection. — A third observation made in objection to the generical view lies in the fact that the context of I John 2:2 teaches that Christ's advocacy and propitiation are the same in design and extent. This is supported by the coordinating conjunction "and," which connects verse 2 with verse 1. Certainly no Calvinistic universalist is willing to admit that Christ's advocacy actually extends to the non-elect. How, then, can propitiation be absolutely universal if Christ's advocacy is not? In an attempt to explain this objection, those who hold to the generical interpretation intimate that it is Christ's advocacy in heaven which particularizes His propitiation on earth and makes it efficacious before the Father. They say that propitiation is conceived as merely laying a basis for actual forgiveness of sins, and is spoken of therefore rather as "sufficient" than efficacious—becoming efficacious only through the act of faith on the part of the believer, by which he secures Christ as his Advocate.17

But this attempted explanation empties the conception of propitiation from its biblical meaning and shifts the saving operation of Christ from His atoning death on earth to His intercession in heaven. However, as Warfield points out,

no support is given this elaborate construction by John; and our present passage is enough to shatter the foundation on which it is built. . . . The "advocacy" of our Lord is indeed based here on his propitiation. But it is based on it not as if it bore merely an accidental relation to it, . . . but as its natural and indeed necessary issue. John introduces the declaration that Christ is—not "was," the propitiation is as continuous in its effect as the advocacy?our propitiation, in order to support his reference of sinning Christians to Christ as their Advocate with the Father, and to give them confidence in the efficacy of his advocacy. The efficacy of the advocacy rests on that of the propitiation, not the efficacy of the propitiation on that of the advocacy. It was in the propitiatory death of Christ that John finds Christ's saving work: the advocacy is only its continuation?its unceasing presentation in heaven. The propitiation accordingly not merely lays a foundation for a saving operation, to follow or not follow as circumstances may determine. It itself saves. And this saving work is common to Christians and "the whole world." By it the sins of the one as of the other are expiated. . . . They no longer exist for God?and are not they blessed whose iniquities are forgiven, and whose sins are covered, to whom the Lord will not reckon sin?18

Grammatical objection. — The fourth observation made in objection to the generical view is grammatical. One contemporary Calvinistic universalist attempts to explain Christ's suffering for the sins of both the elect and non-elect by saying that His suffering was retroactive to Adam's fall and potentially available (a better term would be hypothetically available) for the non-elect both before and after the cross.19 He explains I John 2:2 by saying that Christ is the propitiation for our sins," which means He is the actual propitiation for [believers' sins through faith]. . . . But we are also told that He is the propitiation "for the sins of the whole world,". . [which] means that He is the potential propitiation only [for the non-elect]; otherwise the Apostle would have been teaching universalism.20

Is this not an example of exegetical hopscotch by a Calvinistic hypothetical universalist? But what does I John 2:2 actually say? It says that Christ "is (estin) the propitiation for our sins: and not for ours only, but also for the sins of the whole world." The text does not say that Christ is potentially the propitiation for "our sins and "the sins of the whole world."21

Biblical objection. — The fifth and final observation made in objection to the generical view concerns the use of the term "propitiation" in Romans 3:25, Hebrews 2:17 and I John 4:10. In each of these references, propitiation is restricted to believers, that is, to God's elect. Furthermore, when dealing with a problem text, the principle of interpretation which requires one to determine the usage of a word or term as it is used elsewhere must not be ignored or slighted, especially when it is used elsewhere by the same author. Yet this is done by those who hold to generic universalism, for they do not mention the extent of propitiation in its other occurrences when they discuss the extent in I John 2:2. Both the modified and consistent Calvinists admit that there is some ambiguity in the interpretation of I John 2:2; otherwise there would not be the great theological controversy between them over the meaning of this verse. Is it not proper, then, for I John 4:10 also to be considered to determine if it will help remove some of the ambiguity? Does I John 4:10 help do this? "Herein is love, not that we loved God, but that he loved us, and sent his Son to be the propitiation for our sins." May the reader decide if this verse is helpful in understanding the extent of the atonement in general and the extent of propitiation in I John 2:2 in particular.

The Geographical Interpretation

The second explanation of the universal terminology in I John 2:2 is that termed under the heading of "geographical universalism." This view interprets "and he is the propitiation for our sins" as referring to the recipients of John's epistle, that is, those believers living in Asia Minor. It interprets the latter part of the verse "and not for ours only, but also for the sins of the whole world" as referring to those Christians everywhere outside Asia Minor who confess their sins to Christ their advocate. This view is close to that of Augustine, Calvin and Beza who understand by "the whole world" "the churches of the elect dispersed through the whole world"; and by the declaration that Jesus Christ is "a propitiation for the whole world," that in his blood all the sins of all believers throughout the world are expiated.22

While the geographical view has much scriptural merit and is certainly in harmony with reality, it seems that the term "whole world" conveys something beyond "the world of believers outside Asia Minor." In other words, it seems to be more than just a geographical distinction. In the writer's judgment this something else is explained by the following two interpretations.

The Eschatological Interpretation

The third interpretation of the universal terminology in I John 2:2 is that view termed "eschatological universalism," the future world that is saved at the second coming of Christ, which will include all the elect from all ages. This is the view set forth by Warfield and has much to commend it. In John 1:29, 3:17 and 12:47, John declares that the mission of the Son in coming into the world is not only to save individuals but to save the world itself. "Behold the Lamb of God, which taketh away the sin of the world." This, however, will not come to pass until the eschatological future, at the end time, when God's redemptive plan is complete. Then, and then only, will there be a saved world. Concerning this view, Warfield writes:

It is the great conception which John is reflecting in the phrase, "he is the propitiation for our sins, and not for ours only but for the whole world." This must not be diluted into the notion that he came to offer salvation to the world, or to do his part toward the salvation of the world, or to lay such a basis for salvation that it is the world's fault if it is not saved. John's thinking does not run on such lines; and what he actually says is something very different, namely that Jesus Christ is a propitiation for the whole world, that he has expiated the whole world's sins. He came into the world because of love of the world, in order that he might save the world, and he actually saves the world. Where the expositors have gone astray is in not perceiving that this salvation of the world was not conceived by John — any more than the salvation of the individual — as accomplishing itself all at once. Jesus came to save the world, and the world will through him be saved; at the end of the day he will have a saved world to present to his father. John's mind is running forward to the completion of his saving work; and he is speaking of his Lord from the point of view of this completed work. From that point of view he is the Savior of the world. . . . He proclaims Jesus the Savior of the world and declares him a propitiation for the whole world. He is a universalist; he teaches the salvation of the whole world. But he is not an "each and every" universalist: he is an "eschatological" universalist.23

In Warfield's exposition24 of the term "world" in I John 2:2, he discusses his eschatological universalism view and what this writer has systematically termed "generical" and "geographical" universalism. However, he does not mention or discuss the fourth and following interpretation, namely, that termed "ethnological universalism." Although, in this writer's judgment, Warfield's eschatological universalism adequately explains John 1:29, 3:17 and 12:47 (there will be a future world in which all the sins of that world will be taken away), it does not seem, as presented by Warfield, to fully account for the contextual meaning of kosmos in John 3:16 or in I John 2:2.

The Ethnological Interpretation

The ethnological interpretation asserts that the term "world" in both I John 2:2 and John 3:16, although including the geographical and eschatological views, also stresses that some without distinction, not all without exception, out of the Gentiles as well as out of the Jews (Rom. 9:24) have had their sins propitiated by the death of Christ. It is as though the Lord were saying: "The Jews, Nicodemus, no longer have a national monopoly on the salvation of Jehovah. Do you not, Nicodemus, remember the words of the prophet Isaiah who said, 'I will also give the Holy One of Israel for a light to the Gentiles, that thou mayest be my salvation unto the end of the earth' (Isa. 49:6)? Nicodemus, did not the psalmist prophesy of me when he said, 'therefore will I give thanks unto thee, O Lord, among the heathen, and sing praises unto thy name' (Ps. 18:49)?" Did not "the apostles and brethren that were in Judea," when "they heard that the Gentiles had also received the word of God," declare: "then hath God also to the Gentiles granted repentance unto life" (Acts 11:18)? Is not the term "world" used of the Gentiles by the apostle Paul in Romans 11:11,12,15? Certainly it is. Is it used absolutely (meaning all Gentiles without exception) or is it used relatively (meaning all Gentiles without distinction)? Relative, otherwise Christ's teaching on hell would be erroneous. But if kosmos refers to Gentiles in a relative sense in Romans 11 (and it does), is this how the apostle John uses it in I John 2:2? The writer believes it is. But can it be established whether John, who was probably writing from Ephesus in Asia Minor, was writing first of all to Jewish believers in his epistle while living in a Gentile environment? Arthur Pink cites four convincing reasons that he was. They are:

(1) In the opening verse he says of Christ, "Which we have seen with our eyes. . . and our hands have handled." How impossible it would have been for the apostle Paul to have commenced any of his epistles to Gentile saints with such language! (2) "Brethren, I write no new commandment unto you, but an old commandment which ye had from the beginning" (I John 2:7). The "beginning" here referred to is the beginning of the public manifestation of Christ?in proof compare 1:1, 2:13, etc. Now these believers, the apostle tells us, had the "old commandment" from the beginning. This was true of Jewish believers, but it was not true of Gentile believers. (3) "I write unto you, fathers, because ye have known Him from the beginning" (2:13). Here, again, it is evident that it is Jewish believers that are in view. (4) "Little children, it is the last time: and as ye have heard that Antichrist shall come, even now are there many antichrists; whereby we know that it is the last time. They went out from us, but they were not of us" (2:18,19). These brethren to whom John wrote had "heard" from Christ Himself that Antichrist should come (see Matt. 24). The "many antichrists" whom John declares "went out from us" were all Jews, for during the first century none but a Jew posed as the Messiah. Therefore, when John says "He is the propitiation for our sins," he can only mean for the sins of Jewish believers. (It is true that many things in John's Epistle apply equally to believing Jews and believing Gentiles. Christ is the Advocate of the one, as much as of the other.)25

Furthermore, when John added, "and not for ours only, but also for the sins of the whole world," he signified that Christ was the propitiation for the sins of the Gentile believers too, for, . . . "the world" is a term contrasted from Israel. This interpretation is unequivocally established by a careful comparison of I John 2:2 with John 11:51,52, which is a strictly parallel passage: "And this spake he not of himself: but being high priest that year, he prophesied that Jesus should die for that nation; And not for that nation only, but that also He should gather together in one the children of God that were scattered abroad." Here Caiaphas, under inspiration, made known for whom Jesus should "die." Notice now the correspondency of his prophecy with this declaration of John's: "He is the propitiation for our (believing Israelites) sins." "He prophesied that Jesus should die for that nation." "And not for ours only." "And not for that nation only." "But also for the whole world"?that is, Gentile believers scattered throughout the earth. "He should gather together in one the children of God that were scattered abroad."26

Conclusion

The reader will have to judge for himself which of the four universalistic interpretations of I John 2:2 is the most biblical. For this writer the ethnological view best interprets the meaning of the immediate and general context. It is the writer's position along with most historic Calvinists that in the first part of I John 2:2

the believing Jews alone are intended, of whom John was one; and the addition [last part of the verse] is not an extending of the propitiation of Christ to others than believers, but only to other believers [i.e., Gentile believers]. If it might be granted that in the first branch [first part of the verse] all believers then living were comprehended, who might presently be made partakers of this truth geographical view], yet the increase or accession [last part of the verse] must be, by analogy, only those who were to be in after ages [eschatological view] and remoter places than the name of Christ had then reached unto, — even all those who, according to the prayer of our Savior, John xvii. 20, should believe on his name to the end of the world.27

It can be readily seen from this interpretation that the geographical and eschatological views are both included within the ethnological interpretation. The geographical view is included by its very nature; that is, that God's elect are scattered among the Jews and Gentiles throughout the whole world. And it should be apparent that the ethnological and eschatological views are closely related as seen in John 3:16,17, where both are consecutively set forth. But Warfield's eschatological view, by itself, tends to minimize the geographical or world-wide aspect of Christ's atonement and fails to mention the ethnological view. Although all three views are in harmony with the scriptural doctrine of election, it is this writer's conclusion that the geographical and eschatological views do not, by themselves, fully answer the intention of the apostle John in I John 2:2. Rather it seems that John wants to make it clear to his readers in this verse (as well as John 3:16) that the Old Testament particularism in relation to the nation of Israel is now past, so he uses the universal term "whole world," Christ has now brought in the New Covenant and has prepared the way for New Testament universalism?a divine universalism which teaches that Messiah is the saviour of the spiritual seed of Abraham, who testify in' due season28 that they are none other than Christ's ransomed ones, God's elect. It is for this very reason that the sovereign grace ambassador of Christ knows that God will make "known the riches of his glory on the vessels of mercy" by calling them out "not of the Jews only, but also of the Gentiles" (Rom. 9:23,24). Therefore, he carries out the great commission with full assurance and much boldness, enduring "all things for the elect's sake, that they may also obtain the salvation which is in Christ Jesus with eternal glory" (II Tim. 2:10).

NOTES
For a description of Evangelical Arminians and Calvinistic "four point" universalists or modified Calvinists, see Note No. 1 to the Introduction of Appendix I, the first in a doctrinal series by the author on problem verses relating to the extent of the atonement.

See Note No.2 to the Introduction of Appendix I.

Those who are theologically opposed to historic Calvinism should not hasten to the conclusion that the admission of problem verses by the five point Calvinist diminishes his theological proof for definite atonement anymore than the admission of problem verses (and there are many) by the four point Calvinist necessarily diminishes his theological proof for indefinite atonement. The real issue centers upon what does the Scripture actually teach, a definite or an indefinite atonement? Practically speaking, it is evident that God, in the wisdom of His providence, has not ordained that all true believers should agree upon the extent of the atonement and other important but non-central doctrines. Why He has so ordained is ultimately a mystery to every child of God. We do learn, however, from I Corinthians 11:19 that doctrinal differences in the church are ordained by God "that they which are approved may be made manifest." We also know that, in the wisdom of God's providence, the day of the Lord will come, but not before there is "a falling away first" and the revealing of the "man of sin" (II Thess. 2:3). In this sense, erring on important but non-central doctrines, such as the design of the atonement, can ultimately have serious consequences. As A. A. Hodge wrote over one hundred years ago: "We do not object to Calvinistic Universalism. . . because of any danger which — when considered as a final position — it threatens orthodoxy. We distrust it rather because it is not a final position, but is the first step in the easy descent of error." Archibald Alexander Hodge, The Atonement (reprint of 1867 ed.; Cherry Hill, N. J.: Mack Publishing Co., n.d.), p.238. A study of the history of doctrine verifies Hodge's statement (e.g., cf. Spurgeon and the "Down-Grade Controversy" of 1887-92 in England or the theological erosion from Puritanism to Liberalism within 150 years (1750-1900) in New England). For these reasons the author is convinced that the doctrine of the extent of the atonement is not to be viewed lightly. Historically, a departure from definite atonement has been inseparably linked with a departure from orthodox teaching on the doctrines of original sin and substitutionary atonement. This, in-turn, has seriously affected biblical evangelism and weakened the Christian's trust and assurance in the one who declares: "I am the first, and the last; and beside me there is no God" (Isa. 44:6), "beside me there is no saviour" (Isa. 43:11). The author is not so naive, however, as to believe that this series of doctrinal appendixes will persuade any convinced Evangelical Arminian or modified Calvinist that Christ's substitutionary atonement was particular in design for saving the elect only with no saving provision for the non-elect. Such a change in theological conviction only comes from the Holy Spirit and, for reasons ultimately known only to God, He does not in these last days appear to be changing the convictions of large numbers of traditional evangelical Christians whose existential minds are apparently closed, not being in submission to the teaching of the whole counsel of God, especially with reference to His sovereignty and the particularistic design of the atonement. The author does believe, however, that these doctrinal appendixes may help many of those who have believed through grace and are open to learning more about the doctrines of grace.

The words "through faith" are grammatically more naturally connected with "propitiation" rather than with "being justified," "set forth" or "through his blood." Hence, it is Christ Jesus whom God has set forth as a propitiation to be received by faith through his blood.

Observe also that the love manifested in I John 4:10 is the special love of God, which is the highest form of His love expressed toward man. It is this special redemptive love, the giving of Christ as a sacrifice, which is the motivating cause of giving all the other gifts of saving grace, the "all things" of Romans 8:32. The immediate context in Romans 8 teaches, among other things, that predestination, calling, justification and glorification are included in the "all things" of verse 32, that is, for all the Christians at Rome and, by extension, for all true believers. Now, if this be true (and it is according to context), is not saving faith also included in the "all things"? Is one justified by any other means than faith? No, not according to Scripture. Therefore, if justification is included as one of the gifts of saving grace in the "all things," then saving faith must also be included. Clearly, this passage in Romans 8 limits the extent of Christ's substitutionary death to God's elect.

Lewis Sperry Chafer, Systematic Theology (eight vols.; Dallas, Texas: Dallas Seminary Press, 1948), III, 95-96.

Robert P. Lightner, The Death Christ Died—A Case for Unlimited Atonement (Des Plaines, Illinois: Regular Baptist Press, 1967), p.81.

John Owen, The Death of Death in the Death of Christ (reprinted from Vol. X of Owen's Works, published in 1852 by Johnstone and Hunter, Edinburgh, and ed. by William H. Goold; London: The Banner of Truth Trust, 1959), p. 191.

Ibid.

Chafer, Systematic Theology, V, 197.

Historic Calvinists use the theological term "condition of faith" in a different sense than that of Calvinistic universalists; that is, Christ did not die for any upon condition, if they do believe, but He died for all God's elect that they will believe and believing have eternal life. Because saving faith itself is among the principal effects and fruits of the death of Christ (see Note 5 above), salvation is bestowed conditionally only as viewed by the lost sinner. For him to experience salvation, he must believe; but saving faith, which is the condition for man, is also absolutely procured by Christ. Otherwise, if faith is not procured for believers, then their salvation is not all of grace. When the believer grows in grace and sees that the condition of faith has been procured by Christ, then should he not cry out to God, "O Lord, why me?"

John E. Meeter (ed), Selected Shorter Writings of Benjamin B. Warfield (two vols.; Nutley, New Jersey: Presbyterian and Reformed Publishing Company, 1970-73), I, 172.

Those who hold to universal propitiation in a generical sense are exhorted to refer to Owen's work (pp.189-95; 204-26) where he deals exhaustively with the terms "world," "whole world" and their equivalents. His arguments for definite atonement in response to the generical interpretation of such passages as John 3:16 and I John 2:2 are irrefutably stated and, in the opinion of this writer, can never be biblically disavowed because Owen's arguments are biblical.

Ibid., pp.191-93. The reader is also referred to Hendriksen's work for a study of John's use of the term "world." Cf. William Hendriksen, A., Commentary on the Gospel of John (two vols. in one; London: The Banner of Truth Trust, 1954), I, 79.

Lightner, The Death Christ Died, p.81.

See Note 5, above.

Meeter (ed.), Selected Shorter Writings, I, 173.

Ibid., pp. 173-74.

Norman F. Douty, The Death Christ Died, (Swengel, Pennsylvania: Reiner Publications, 1972), p.29.

Ibid., pp.32-33.

The verb "is', (estin) is in the present tense and indicative mood (the mood of certainty or reality) and governs both clauses in the verse. If Christ is the potential propitiation for the non-elect, why was not the subjunctive mood used (the mood of mild contingency or potentiality which often assumes unreality depending, of course, on the context)? Why does not contextual exegesis support the translation that Christ is the potential propitiation of our sins and the sins of the whole world? Douty simply does not address this grammatical problem and provides absolutely no exegetical support for asserting that Christ is the potential propitiation for those who die in unbelief.

Meeter (ed.), Selected Shorter Writings, 1, 170.

Ibid., pp.176-77.

Ibid., pp.169-77.

Arthur W. Pink, The Atonement (Venice, Florida: Chapel Library, n.d.), pp.13-i4.

Ibid., p.14.

Owen, The Death of Death in the Death of Christ, p.226.

"The 'due season' comprises the entire new dispensation. . . . Not during the old dispensation but only during the new can the mystery be fully revealed that all men, Gentiles as well as Jews, are now on an equal footing; that is, that the Gentiles have become fellow-heirs and fellow-members of the body and fellow-partakers of the promise in Christ Jesus through the gospel' (Eph. 3:6; cf. Eph. 2:11,12)." Cf. William Hendriksen, New Testament Commentary: Exposition of the Pastoral Epistles (Grand Rapids: Baker Book House, 1957), p.99.

Gordon Clark on Regeneration

Regeneration: The Key to Believing the Truth

When Adam fell, the human race became, not stupid so that the truth was hard to understand, but inimical, to the acceptance of the truth. Men did not like to retain God in their knowledge and changed the truth of God into a lie, for the carnal mind is enmity against God. Hence the preaching of the cross is to them that perish foolishness, for the natural man receives not the things of the Spirit of God because they are spiritually discerned. In order to accept the Gospel, therefore, it is necessary to be born again. The abnormal, depraved intellect must be remade by the Holy Spirit; the enemy must be made a friend. This is the work of regeneration, and the heart of stone can be taken away and a heart of flesh can be given only by God himself. Resurrecting the man who is dead in sin and giving him a new life, far from being a human achievement, requires nothing less then almighty power.

It is therefore impossible by argument or preaching alone to cause anyone to believe the Bible. Only God can cause such belief. At the same time, this does not mean that argument is useless. Peter tells us, “always be ready to give a defense to everyone who asks you a reason for the hope that is in you.” This was the constant practice of the apostles. Stephen disputed with the Libertines; the Jerusalem council disputed; in Ephesus Paul disputed three months in the synagogue and then continued disputing in the school of Tyrannus. (Acts 6:9; 15:7; 19:8,9: compare Acts 17:2; 18:4, 19; 24:25). Anyone who is unwilling to argue, dispute, and reason is disloyal to his Christian duty.

At this point the natural question is, What is the use of al this expounding and explaining if it does not produce belief? The answer should be clearly understood. The witness or testimony of the Holy Spirit is a witness to something. The Spirit cannot produce belief in Christ unless a sinner has heard of Christ. “How then shall they call on him of whom they have not heard?...So then faith comes by hearing, and hearing by the Word of God” (Romans 10:14,17).

No doubt God in his omnipotence could reveal the necessary information to each man individually without a written Bible or ministerial preaching. But this is not what God has done. God gave the apostles and preachers the duty of expounding the message; but the production of belief is the work of the Spirit, for faith is the gift of God.

This is part of the reason why it was said above that the best procedure for us, if we want someone to accept the doctrine of plenary and verbal inspiration, is to expound the Scripture in detail. We may well use archaeology and historical criticism too, but the main task is to communicate the message of the Bible in as understandable language as we can manage.

It is to be noted too that the sinner, without any special work of the Spirit, can understand the message. Belief in its truth and understanding its meaning are two different things. The Bible can be understood by the same methods of study used on Euclid or Aristotle. Despite some pious disclaimers, it is true that antagonistic unbelievers often enough understand the Bible better than devout Christians. The Pharisees saw the significance of Christ’s claims to deity more quickly and more clearly than the disciples did.

As Paul persecuted the Christians in Jerusalem and set out for Damascus, he understood the words, “Jesus is Lord” as well as any of the twelve. It was precisely because he understood so well that he persecuted so zealously. Had he been unsure of the meaning, he would not have been so exercised. But the trouble was, he did not believe it. On the contrary, he believed that it was false. Then on the Damascus road Christ appeared to him and caused him to believe that the statement was true. Paul did not understand the phrase any better a moment after his conversion than a moment before. Doubtless in later years God revealed further information to him for use in his epistles. But at the moment, Christ did not enlarge his understanding one whit; he caused him to receive, accept, or believe what he had already understood quite well. Thus it is that the Spirit witnessed to the message previously communicated.

Strong emphasis needs to be placed on the work of the Holy Spirit. Man is dead in sin, an enemy of God, opposed to all righteousness and truth. He needs to be changed. Neither the preacher nor, much less, the sinner himself can cause the change. But “blessed is the man whom you choose, and cause to approach you” (Psalm 65:4). “And I will…take the stony heart out of their flesh, and give them a heart of flesh” (Ezekiel 11:19; 36:26, 27). “As many as had been appointed to eternal life believed” (Acts 13:48). “God…when we were dead in trespasses, made us alive together with Christ” (Ephesians 2:4-5). For it is God who works in you both to will and to do for his good pleasure” (Philippians 2:13). “God from the beginning chose you for salvation through sanctification by the Spirit and belief in the truth” (2 Thessalonians 2:13). “Of his own will he brought us forth by the word of truth” (James 1:18).

These verses, which primarily refer to regeneration, are applicable to our acceptance of the Bible as the very word of God. Indeed, the new life which the second birth initiates – the life to which we are raised from the death of sin – is precisely the life of faith; and a full faith includes a plenary and verbal inspiration of the salvation message. It is the gift of God.

This is why the greatest of all the creeds issuing from the Reformation, the Westminster Confession says:

The authority of the Holy Scripture, for which it ought to be believed and obeyed, dependeth not upon the testimony of any man or Church, but wholly upon God (who is Truth itself), the author thereof; and, therefore, it is to be received, because it is the Word of God. …our full persuasion and assurance of the infallible truth and divine authority thereof is from the inward work of the Holy Spirit, bearing witness, by and with the Word, in our heart (I,iv and v.)

In the last analysis, therefore–although historical and archaeological confirmation of the Bible’ accuracy is of great interest to us and of great embarrassment to unbelievers-a conviction that the Bible is really the Word of God cannot be the conclusion of a valid argument based on more clearly evident premises. This conviction is produced by the Holy Spirit himself.

It must always be kept in mind that the proclamation in the Gospel is part of a spiritual struggle against the supernatural powers of the evil one, and victory comes only through the omnipotent grace of God. Accordingly, as Jesus explained his mission to both Peter and the Pharisees, so we today must expound and explain the Scripture in all its fullness to all sorts of men; and we can then be assured that our Father in Heaven will reveal his truth to some of them.

(Gordon H. Clark, “God’s Hammer: The Bible and Its Critics” pg.20-23)

 

Technorati Tags: regeneration,new birth,Gordon Clark

Unconditional Love

Just what does the Scripture say?  David Merck on the subject.  It's an 80 page PDF.  Food for thought.

Technorati Tags: love,unconditional love

Strange Baptist Fire on Election vs. Foresight

Election vs. Foresight

As it is impossible to deny the reality of divine election upon even a cursory reading of the scriptures, it appears that the method common in many Baptist and other Protestant circles, in an effort to unite election with the human perspective of fairness and free will, is to redefine election, to strip it of any real power. You may hear reasoning such as “God looked down the corridors of time to see who would believe” and so elected them. I expect that many through the ages, and perhaps even some on this site (as the archives may attest), have aptly used scripture to show the problems with such a notion (logical inconsistencies aside), but as I have recently been reading Calvin on this, several relevant excerpts of his are given below. It is copied from the John Allen translation, as I’ve become somewhat accustomed to that one. The emboldened fonts are added here.

It is a notion commonly entertained, that God, foreseeing what would be the respective merits of every individual, makes a correspondent distinction between different persons; that he adopts as children such as will be deserving of his grace, and devotes to the damnation of death others, whose dispositions he sees will be inclined to wickedness and impiety. Thus they not only obscure election by covering it with the veil of foreknowledge, but pretend that it originates in another cause [other than God's good pleasure]. Nor is this commonly received notion the opinion of the vulgar only, for it has had great advocates in all ages….

God’s sovereign election of some, and preterition [passing by] of others, they make the subject of formal accusation against him….

Now, it is of importance to attend to what the Scripture declares respecting every individual. Paul’s assertion, that we were “chosen in Christ before the foundation of the world” (Eph. 1:4), certainly precludes any consideration of merit in us; for it is as though he had said, our heavenly Father, finding nothing worthy of his choice in all the posterity of Adam, turned his views towards his Christ, to choose members from his body whom he would admit to the fellowship of life. Let believers, then, be satisfied with this reason, that we were adopted in Christ to the heavenly inheritance, because in ourselves we were incapable of such high dignity. He has a similar remark in another place, where he exhorts the Colossians to “give thanks unto the Father, who had made them meet [fit] to be partakers of the inheritance of the saints.” (Col. 1:12)  If election precedes this grace of God, which makes us meet to obtain the glory of the life to come, what will God find in us to induce him to elect us? Another passage from this apostle will still more clearly express my meaning. “He hath chosen us,” he says, “before the foundation of the world, according to the good pleasure of his will, that we should be holy, and without blame before him” (Eph. 1:4-5); where he opposes the good pleasure of God to all our merits whatsoever.

Calvin summarizes his main theme in this, showing that the scripture,

stating them to have been “chosen that they might be holy,” fully refutes the error which derives election from foreknowledge; since Paul, on the contrary, declares that all the virtue in men is the effect of election… This overturns any means of election which men imagine in themselves… For say, ‘Because he foresaw they would be holy, therefore he chose them,’ and you will invert the order of Paul. We may safely infer, then, If he chose us that we should be holy, his foresight of our future holiness was not the cause of his choice…

And what consistency would there be in asserting, that things derived from election were the causes of election? A subsequent clause seems further to confirm what he had said - “according to his good pleasure, which he purposed in himself.” (Eph. 1:9) For the assertion, that God purposed in himself , is equivalent to saying, that he considered nothing out of himself, with any view to influence his determination.

- excerpts from “Institutes of the Christian Religion”, Book III, Chapter XXII

While here Calvin may appear to be dealing with outward works, he shows in other places that this divine catalyst of election certainly applies to our will also. Perhaps in a future post more on this would be warranted. For now suffice it to say that immediately following Paul’s exhortation to believers to “work out” their salvation, he plainly states, “for it is God who works in you, both to will and to work for his good pleasure.” (Phil 2:13) Now, if even we as those regenerated have need for God to grant us wills to please Him, how much more those still in need of conversion?

Sola gratia,

Darrin

Strange Baptist Fire

Technorati Tags: election,foresight,John Calvin,Institutes of The Christian Religion,God's sovereignty

James White on Romans 9. The MP3 can be listened to/downloaded here.

Dr. Bruce Ware from Southern Baptist Theological Seminary from the DVD The Great Debate: Predestination vs. Free Will

Closing Statement - Debate on Calvinism
James White

aomin.org

Free Will vs. God's Sovereignty

Amazing Grace: The History & Theology of Calvinism

Calvinism, Arminianism and Eternal Security

Calvinism teaches that freedom is "the ability to act according to your desires." Furthermore, it teaches that the will "always chooses according to its greatest desire." For example, if I have a choice between eating a steak or eating chopped liver, I will always choose the steak because I desire it most. In fact, it could be said that I was unable to choose the liver since I did not want the liver. If you have no desire for something, you simply will not choose it.

Arminianism teaches that freedom is the ability to have chosen other than you did. For example, on the Arminian view I did not make a free choice in choosing the steak. Why? Because my choice was determined by something -- my greatest desire. They say that unless I was able to choose the liver over the steak, I was not acting freely when I chose the steak.

Calvinists are not troubled by the fact that I "could not have done otherwise." They point to a distinction between natural ability to do otherwise and moral ability to do otherwise. They believe that responsibility (and thus freedom) rest upon natural ability to do otherwise, but not moral ability to do otherwise.

Natural ability to do otherwise means that there are no physical constraints forcing one to act. It means that if one wants to do otherwise, he can. If natural ability is taken away, responsibility goes as well. For example, if my teacher commands me to fly like a bird to Canada, he cannot hold me accountable for not doing it because I do not have the physical capability to do so.

Moral inability simply means that you will not choose what you do not want to choose. It does not mean that you could not chose it if you wanted it. It means that you cannot choose it because you have no desire for it. Moral inability, therefore, does not remove accountability. For example, if my teacher commands me to do an assignment, my lack of moral ability would mean I have no desire to do the assignment. Let's say I have a greater desire to watch T.V. than do the assignment. Obviously, I could do it if I wanted to, but I simply do not want to. Clearly, my desire to watch T.V. being greater than my desire to obey my teacher would not remove my moral accountability.

In the steak example, I made a free choice on the Calvinist view because I had the natural ability to choose the liver if I had wanted to choose the liver. Nothing outside of myself was forcing me to choose the steak. I was not physically prevented from eating liver. Since I had the physical capability to choose the liver, I made a real choice. My inability to choose the liver was a moral inability, not a natural inability. When I say I was unable to choose the liver, I mean that I could not bring myself to choose the liver because I had no desire for the liver.

Which view of freedom does the Bible teach? The Calvinist or the Arminian? A quick look at the biblical teaching of eternal security reveals that the Calvinist view is correct.

Once a person comes to Christ, he cannot loose his salvation (John 10:26-30). He is eternally saved and will go to heaven when he dies. It is not possible for him to be lost. This is a big problem for the Arminian view of freedom. If it is not possible for a person to loose his salvation, then there are two options:

1. It is possible for the believer to later on reject Christ and reject eternal life, but God will still take him to heaven when he dies even though he has rejected it.
2. It is not possible for a believer to ever reject Christ and eternal life once he is saved.

Under option one, clearly the person's will is violated. For the person would be rejecting Christ but God would be taking him to heaven anyway. He would be saving the person against his will. This would obviously be inconsistent with both the Arminian view of freedom and the Bible.

So we must conclude that a true Christian will never utterly reject Christ and heaven. But if it is not possible for a person to reject Christ, then the person cannot do other than continue believing. This is another problem for the Arminian view - - on the Arminian view, the minute that you cannot do otherwise, you are not free. Thus, eternal security is inconsistent with the Arminian view of freedom.

The Arminian may respond "the person will never reject Christ because they don't want to reject Christ. They are freely continuing to believe because they want to continue believing. They cannot reject Christ because they do not want to." But isn't that the Calvinist view of freedom? It certainly isn't the Arminian view because the person cannot do otherwise than continue believing. Thus, the Arminian view defeats itself and folds into Calvinism.

The issue is, why can't the person do otherwise than continue believing? The Calvinist answers that as long as the reason is that he wants to continue believing, it is a genuine choice, even though it can't be otherwise.

The Biblical teaching of eternal security clearly teaches the Calvinist view of freedom--the person cannot reject eternal life once they are saved because they do not want to reject eternal life. God causes us to continue wanting to believe in Him once we are saved -- Jeremiah 32:40; Ezekiel 36:27.

For those who do not believe in eternal security, my argument need not change much. In heaven we will no longer sin or reject Christ. So, it is not possible for a saint in heaven to reject God. This leads to the same dilemma as eternal security, unless one accepts the Calvinist view of freedom.

What implications does this have? While there are many, a central one is that this reveals that God is able to determine who will be saved without violating our wills or forcing us to believe. If a person is elect, God does not force him to believe but neither does does He leave open the possibility that he will use his will to reject Him and overthrow His plan. For if God prepares his heart and gives him a desire for Christ that is greater than his desire to remain in sin, the person will most certainly come--and will come freely.

Perhaps the implications for salvation can be summed up most clearly like this: If God is able, after we have been saved, to keep us believing in Christ without violating our freedom, why can't He, before we are saved, cause us to believe in Christ in order to become saved--without violating our wills? In light of what we have seen, it seems clear that He can.

Matt Perman - Contend For The Faith

While the value of the atonement was sufficient to save all mankind, it was efficient to save only the elect. It is indifferently well adapted to the salvation of one man to that of another, thus making the salvation of every man objectively possible; yet because of subjective difficulties, arising on account of the sinners own inability either to see or appreciate the things of God, only those are saved who are regenerated and sanctified by the Holy Spirit. The reason why God does not apply this grace to all men has not been fully revealed.

When the atonement is made universal its inherent value is destroyed. If it is applied to all men, and if some are lost, the conclusion is that it makes salvation objectively possible for all but that it does not actually save anybody. According to the Arminian theory the atonement has simply made it possible for men to co-operate with divine grace and thus save mselves if they will. But tell us of one cured of disease and yet dying of cancer, and the story will be equally luminous with that of one eased of sin and yet perishing through unbelief. The nature of the atonement settles its extent. If it merely made salvation possible, it applied to all men. If it effectively secured salvation, it had reference only the elect. As Dr. Warfield says, "The things we have to choose between are an atonement of high value, or an atonement of wide extension. The two cannot go together." The work of Christ can be universalized only by evaporating its substance.

Let there be no misunderstanding at this point. The Arminian limits the atonement as certainly as does the Calvinist. The Calvinist limits the extent of it in that he says it does not apply to all persons (although as has already been shown, he believes that it is efficacious for the salvation of the large proportion of the human race); while the Arminian limits the power of it, for he says that in itself it does not actually save anybody. The Calvinist limits it quantitatively, but not qualitatively; the Arminian limits it qualitatively, but not quantitatively. For the Calvinist it is like a narrow bridge which goes all the way across the stream; for the Arminian it is like a great wide bridge which goes only half-way across. As a matter of fact, the Arminian places more severe limitations on the work of Christ than does the Calvinist.

Lorraine Boettner - The Reformed Doctrine of Predestination

"All evangelicals pray for the salvation of individuals, fully expecting that the effective prayers of the righteous can accomplish much (Jas 5:16). But how can Arminians pray for the conversion of an individual person if God would have to override the free will to convert that person? The most Arminians could pray for would be neutral, nonthreatening things that do not infringe upon the 'rights' of the sinner.

Calvinists can happily pray for specific people to be converted, because they know quite well that if God does not in mercy intervene to free sinners from spiritual death, they will never be saved at all. God may have willed that particular prayers will be part of the chain leading to a person's salvation. Prayer is both reasonable and effective, precisely because God is in control and can override the human will to answer them."

-R.K. McGregor Wright, No Place for Sovereignty p.193

The housecleaning is done

All prior posts have been removed and we're starting with a fresh, clean slate. Hopefully with more frequent posts, also.